di Marco Rota – It’s interesting to try to understand the story of the former Wagner Group, now Africa Corps. This group started as a military contractor, but now it’s a new way for Russia and other countries involved in the energy war to do business. It’s a strategic holding company for both finance and terrorism.
Late July, the British government imposed sanctions on 18 Russian intelligence officers for some “irresponsible, destructive and destabilizing hybrid activity” around the world. Not surprisingly. In fact, the number of suspected Russian sabotage operations in Europe almost quadrupled between 2023 and 2024, and beyond. 30 incidents have been recorded last year, such as arson attacks in London, damage to undersea cables, many in the Baltic Sea, as well as interference with water supply systems in Finland and Germany, and attacks on military equipment across northern and eastern Europe. Making sense of this surge, let me explain the root of all rough operations.
Hybrid is the dry term that spies and military use to refer to dirty tricks since the 1970s, including the physical-cybernetic warfare between nation-states, conducted in a gray zone that often defies boundaries, where there are no rules of engagement, no codes of honor, no respect for the enemy, and no mercy for defenseless civilians.
For decades, all major and mid-sized powers around the world have directly or indirectly supported dirty warfare actions as a means of influence, sabotage, and counterinsurgency – from El Salvador to Chechnya, from Guatemala to Colombia, from East Timor to Bosnia, from Kenya to Borneo – spanning most of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, before ushering in our era.
Armed conflicts, like other human rights crises, present serious challenges in collecting comprehensive or even representative data. However, new statistical methods are improving the accuracy of human rights research, in the attempt to define these measures more fully, beyond the experience of Argentina’s “Dirty War,” where the term originated. As such, dirty warfare is the logical outcome of certain intelligence-related operations under conditions in which political actors respond to perceived or real extreme threats to the established order. It’s a systematic campaign of violence against segments of civilian population, where perpetrators aim to obscure the extent of violence and their involvement, primarily to instill fear and neutralize political opposition.
These operations are state-planned, supported by intelligence agencies, and executed by special forces often in conjunction with PMCs (Private Military Companies), trained in paramilitary, guerrilla, counterinsurgency, and political warfare, all within the framework of unconventional or hybrid warfare.
Some PMCs – particularly elite ones – also train regular army personnel, especially where national armed forces lack operational quality. Broadly, these entities fall into three categories: mercenaries, PMCs, and PSCs (Private Security Companies).
According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): “The use of mercenaries re-emerged during the decolonization wars and subsequent civil conflicts. Following an initial surge, which prompted the creation of the UN mandate on mercenaries, the phenomenon declined but resurfaced in a different form through the rise of private military companies. Firms like Executive Outcomes operated in Angola and Sierra Leone, while Sandline International was active in Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone. These early PMCs, which were directly involved in combat, were eventually supplanted by more corporate and less overtly militarized entities.”
The distinctions between mercenaries, PMCs, and PSCs are often blurred, as all may be contractually tied to governments for tasks ranging from logistics to combat. These companies are predominantly headquartered in the United States, UK, Canada, Israel, Russia, France, and South Africa, with clients across the US, Europe, China, Russia, and the Middle East.
While many PMCs operate within international and national legal frameworks, escalating global tensions and growing demand for armed manpower have weakened oversight and increased illicit recruitment.
To distance themselves from the negative legal implications of mercenarism (UN, 2018), contemporary PMCs increasingly emphasize protection and training contracts over combat roles. This is a strategic shift to avoid falling under the legal definition of mercenaries under international law. Yet, given the current numerous global conflicts, there’s an increasing reliance on mercenaries. The war in Ukraine has used up almost all the potential fighters in the world.
In recent decades – especially post-9/11 – governments struggled to provide clear objectives to military leadership, resulting in unjustified casualties, prolonged or “frozen” conflicts, and ballooning defense budgets. The costs and human losses of traditional conflicts have steadily provoked public outrage and calls for withdrawal, pushing governments to seek alternatives to pursue their national interests. Private military companies are attractive because they’re cheaper, more flexible, and you can more easily deny that you’re using them. So, states increasingly avoided employing regular armed forces. Instead, they’re using economic cyber warfare and mercenaries. Three main reasons matter– modern wars never threaten the survival of the state; the armies of democratic countries are designed for conventional conflicts; and dirty wars, terrorism, and wet-work are easier to orchestrate.
The UN Working Group on Mercenaries (2020) found that many actors, while not legally classified as mercenaries, exhibit similar characteristics – underscoring the need for case-by-case distinctions.
As the war in Ukraine restored the traditional warfare – large-scale maneuvers, conscription, and heavy artillery –PMCs deployed elite units for precision missions or mass-recruit impoverished mercenaries for high-risk engagements.
The Wagner Group and similar entities deserve special mention due to their close ties to Russia’s military and intelligence services, such as the FSB and GRU. Named after Hitler’s favorite composer, Wagner originated in Ukraine during the 2014 Donbas conflict, later becoming active in Syria. Founded by Dmitry Utkin – a GRU veteran – the group initially worked with Moran Security Group and the Slavonic Corps. Despite arrests upon their return from Syria for illegal mercenary activity, the group continued recruiting personnel drawn by promises of high pay ($20,000 for disability, $40,000 for death), often from former riot police or special forces. The history of the Wagner Group is closely tied to Yevgeny Prigozhin, in Putin’s Russia the most feared men – and the most influential warlord worldwide – before his failed coup and his so far mysterious death.
Notwithstanding, Russian PMCs are never fully independent; their missions align with Kremlin objectives. The American scholar from Columbia University Kimberly Marten argues that Wagner functions more as a procurement mechanism for the Russian Defense Ministry and GRU than as a standalone corporation.
Following the collapse of the USSR, Russia saw a surge in demand for private security, giving rise to a burgeoning industry rooted in veteran associations. These eventually merged with the interests of oligarchs and state-run energy giants like Gazprom and Rosneft – legally authorized to employ private armed forces.
Though Russian law prohibits mercenary activity abroad, PMCs have been active in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Sudan, Mali, Egypt, Venezuela, and more. Wagner alone deployed over 30,000 fighters by early 2022, mostly in Ukraine.
In December 2021, the EU sanctioned Wagner-linked companies for violating human rights and fueling conflict in Ukraine, Libya, and Syria. Russia uses these operations to extend its influence in fragile African states rich in resources, offering military services in exchange for natural resource concessions and strategic access.
Despite periodic attempts to legalize PMCs – supported by officials like Dmitry Rogozin and Sergey Lavrov –Russian bills have consistently failed due to infighting among the Defense Ministry, FSB, and SVR. Legal ambiguity allows the Kremlin to use PMCs while denying official responsibility.
PMCs are something similar to medieval “companies of fortune.” They can step in quickly, fight counterinsurgency, or increase it, protect people, evacuate them, and spread propaganda. However, most Russian PMCs lack the extensive training of their Western equivalents. Wagner’s failures in Mozambique and its high casualties in Ukraine highlight its operational deficiencies.
Frictions also emerge between Russian PMCs and host-nation forces, echoing Soviet-era tensions. Wagner units often bully local troops, who, in turn, resent Russian arrogance.
The Kremlin fears PMCs might evolve into autonomous political actors capable of contracting with rival agencies and influencing national policy. Despite their growing role, Putin remains wary of PMCs undermining central power.
For instance, Euro Polis LLC, linked to Wagner, secured a 25% stake in Syrian oil and gas fields in return for reclaiming and defending them – a sign of PMCs’ deep entanglement in geopolitical and economic strategy.
PMCs offer tactical advantages in protecting infrastructure, securing elite figures, and performing deniable operations. Wagner’s role in Crimea and Donbas exemplifies how they facilitate surprise maneuvers while enabling the Kremlin to freeze conflicts diplomatically.
Yet in full-scale wars against NATO-trained forces, such as in Ukraine, PMCs struggle. Russia has even recruited 15,000 Nepali fighters, promising $2,000/month and fast-tracked citizenship. These recruits train alongside others from the Global South at facilities like Avangard.
After Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death (provided he’s actually dead), Wagner’s presence became less noticeable. The group hasn’t officially split up, but it now operates in a more secretive way and is more closely managed by the Ministry of Defense.
The BARS (Combat Army Reserve of the Country), created in 2015, is distinct from PMCs. Comprising mostly unskilled, older reservists, BARS played a secondary role in Ukraine, suffering heavy losses. Although praised by Putin, its effectiveness is limited, and many of its units overlap with PMCs, operating in a legal gray zone.
BARS contracts are signed with military commissariats, but members lack formal status in the Russian Armed Forces. This ambiguity stirred up legal disputes over injury and death compensation. As a result, the military value of PMCs in Ukraine has been marginal, contributing to a fragmented command structure. Localized forces in Crimea and Belgorod further decentralize control, suggesting a creeping feudalization of Russian security.
Putin revealed that Wagner received 86 billion rubles from the Defense Ministry between May 2022 and May 2023, while Prigozhin’s Concord earned 80 billion from army catering contracts – exposing a lucrative nexus of state contracts, corruption, and private force.
After Prigozhin’s death, Defense Ministry officials vied for control of Wagner’s assets in Syria and the Central African Republic, revealing internal power struggles within Russia’s security apparatus. Meanwhile, recruitment continues in secrecy, often overlapping with organized crime.
In the end, while PMCs offer Russia plausible deniability and flexibility, their limited effectiveness in major conflicts, legal ambiguity, and internal rivalries raise questions about their long-term utility and control.
From early 2024 onward, Wagner’s operations in Africa underwent a fundamental transformation. Following the deaths of Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin in August 2023, the Russian Defense Ministry initiated the formal takeover of Wagner’s assets overseas, rebranding its African operations as the Africa Corps. This new paramilitary structure is officially under the command of the Ministry of Defense and is intended to supplant Wagner across key theatres including Mali, Libya, Niger, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic (CAR).
Recruitment resumed aggressively in early 2024: Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels posted multiple adverts –with slogans like “Wagner has a lot of work to do in Africa!” – and several thousand personnel were reportedly redeployed from Ukraine to Africa, serving both as private contractors and formal ministry-controlled troops tasked with training regimes across the Sahel.
Violence linked to Russian mercenaries across Africa surged in late 2023 and into 2024, doubling political violence incidents compared to pre-August levels, especially in Mali. Analysts warn the trend continued into 2025, with expansions into new hotspots across the region.
Despite formal restructuring, Wagner-linked units remain most active in the Central African Republic. There, they are reportedly constructing a hub capable of hosting up to 10,000 troops by 2030, consolidating Russia’s long-term presence and economic interests. Wagner personnel maintain control over lucrative gold and diamond mines, helped by illicit revenue channels – funds that some reports suggest may have netted over $2.5 billion to support broader Russian military operations.
By mid-2025, the Africa Corps had largely replaced Wagner in Mali: official announcements in June 2025 confirmed withdrawal of Wagner elements, leaving Africa Corps as the sole Russian paramilitary force in the country. Similar transitions occurred across Libya, CAR, and Burkina Faso, consolidating the Ministry’s control over formerly Wagner-dominated regions.
Human rights violations persist. In July 2025, Wagner-linked personnel violently confronted civilians at the Ndassima gold mine in CAR, killing at least 11 young people scavenging for residue—a case widely condemned as extrajudicial execution with no accountability from local authorities.
Starting in 2024, Europe has seen a sharp escalation in hostile activities attributed directly or indirectly to Russia, with a key role played by entities linked to the Wagner Group, the GRU, and other Russian intelligence structures.
These actions have included physical sabotage, arson, recruitment operations, and cyberattacks – core elements of a broader hybrid warfare strategy aimed at destabilizing the continent without triggering open conflict.
One of the most prominent cases occurred in March 2024, when a warehouse in London used for collecting aid for Ukraine was set on fire by three British nationals recruited via Telegram by Russian handlers associated with Wagner, a tactic that has since been repeated in other countries. In Vilnius, Lithuania, a firebombing at a shopping center was classified as a terrorist act, while in the Czech Republic and Poland, multiple sabotage attempts targeting railway infrastructure and bus depots have been uncovered.
At the same time, European governments have reported a surge in cyberattacks against state institutions, energy companies, and communication networks. Groups like Fancy Bear (APT28), tied to the GRU, have carried out systematic operations against critical infrastructure, and the pro-Russian hacktivist collective NoName057 launched DDoS attacks during high-profile events such as Eurovision and NATO summits.
Operations have also targeted submarine cables, maritime GPS, and logistics hubs, indicating a high degree of coordination. Recruitment has primarily taken place through encrypted platforms, especially Telegram, with Russian agents offering money to vulnerable individuals – often young men with criminal records – to carry out arson or sabotage.
In some cases, plots to kidnap Russian dissidents or pro-Ukrainian activists in Western Europe have been uncovered and thwarted. European authorities have responded with targeted sanctions against GRU officers and Wagner operatives, with the UK formally designating Wagner as a terrorist organization. Between 2024 and mid-2025, the number of sabotage incidents linked to Russian hybrid operations doubled down compared to the previous year, with dozens of arrests and ongoing investigations. This campaign fits perfectly with a coherent strategy of internal destabilization, aimed at undermining public trust, inciting unrest, and weakening Western support for Ukraine through asymmetric, unconventional, and plausibly deniable means.
The dirty part of intelligence and mercenaries work, such as infrastructures sabotage, disinformation, murder, kidnapping, is becoming more and more relevant. Pressure is mounting up, time is lacking, everything is more delicate, soon inhibitions to the use of violence have been lost.
The activities of the Wagner Group don’t pair with those of traditional private military companies. Don’t’ be mistaken: it doesn’t rely on the old privatization of war.
Since 2022, this entity has occupied a gray area. However, given the expansion of Russian influence and the unmistakable economic gains of some Russian companies, especially in the energy sector, similar entities are already emerging in non-Western countries. Chinese, Korean, Venezuelan, and Syrian groups, as well as those in the Balkans and Africa, are clearly attempting to emulate it.
The United States added many organizations to a list of sanctioned entities across the United States for providing or helping to move money. The Wagner Group includes companies like DM LLC (Russian) and Diamville SAU (Central African Republic) and Midas Resources (Central African Republic). However, these groups have a solid financial foundation.
In a way, there’s a clear increase in the importance of official economic cooperation as a way of financing the Africa Corps, and a switch away from the risk factor of the model developed by Prigozhin.
This complex galaxy morphed into a political entity capable of interacting with Kremlin, the Russian military, intelligence agencies, and worldwide mafia organizations, also changing the way other nations view and use PMCs.
Prigozhin’s world has set a precedent. The former Wagner Group is involved in the regular and irregular conflicts of the current era. It can gather information independently and move significant amounts of money using regular and unusual financial channels, traditional currencies, cryptocurrencies, and commercial intermediaries in minerals and weapons systems. It manages entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, journalists, TV personalities, also in Western countries. The Africa Corps is like a state within a state. It follows Moscow’s political orders while keeping its own goals. This network has gotten so powerful thanks to the high-level support of the influential people in Moscow, from army commanders to the top spies.
It’s possible that Prigozhin is dead, but his success and downfall demonstrated how Putin’s regime is unstable.
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Marco Rota serves as an adviser on geopolitics, country risk, and narrative warfare. He has worked as a consultant for several risk management and security consulting companies.
He has served as an adviser to the Italian Senate and currently functions in a similar capacity for the European Parliament.
